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This is a response to Macleod 2012’s argument that the history of unjust property acquisitions 
requires rich libertarians to give away everything in excess of equality. At first, problematic 
questions are raised. How much property is usually inherited or illegitimate? Why should 
legitimate inheritance be affected? What of the burden of proof and court cases? A 
counterfactual problem is addressed. Three important cases are considered: great earned 
wealth; American slavery; land usurpation. All are argued to be problematic for Macleod 
2012’s thesis. Various problems are explained concerning using the Nozickian argument to 
decide the alleged excess that rich libertarians own. The essay’s main error is the 
presupposition that free markets do not help the worst-off. The majority of unjust holdings 
today are not the result of historical injustices but arise through continuing transfers enabled 
by taxation and state-regulation. More study of libertarian contributions to the social sciences 




Unlike Macleod 2012, this response is not going to discuss ―the ‗rich egalitarian problem‘ posed by 
G.A. Cohen and then consider a variant of this problem called the ‗rich socialist problem‘‖ (68). This 
is because a ―rich socialist‖ is not a significant theoretical problem for socialism even if it is a 
―personal behavior‖ problem, which is unlikely. For to advocate a social ideology is not thereby to 
commit oneself to trying to live by it personally. That would, at least sometimes, be as absurd as 
trying to play bridge when one‘s partners are playing poker, just because one advocates bridge as the 
better game. The two big theoretical problems for socialism are how the abolition of money (or, if 
some version of ‗market socialism‘, then extreme economic interventions) can avoid, first, destroying 
society-wide economic calculation (and thereby the economy), as well as, second, destroying overall 
liberty and welfare. These problems make socialism a non-starter.
2
 With the concern about ―personal 
behavior‖, socialists appear to be ―Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.‖3 
The concern here is where Macleod 2012 says it will ―explain the ‗rich libertarian problem‘ and 
explain why, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is more intractable than the rich socialist problem.‖ 
This is important because, as will be explained, this does in principle pose a significant theoretical 
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problem that goes beyond any ―personal behavior‖ issues. Indeed, if sound, Macleod 2012‘s argument 
would make libertarianism a non-starter. The general idea is that the ubiquity of historically 
illegitimate property-holdings transitively undermines all property-holdings in excess of equality; now 
and possibly forever. This is a version of a popular criticism that is often thought to have some force. 
In Chapter 4 there is a brief reply in response to Vallentyne 2010 on this issue. But Macleod 2012 
takes the point further, and with more relevant argument, than many critics of libertarianism. That 
merits a more detailed response. However, the relevant portion of that essay is only a couple of 
thousand words long. And this reply will not be very much longer. A great deal has been written on 
some of the issues arising (theoretical and empirical), to which this response cannot hope to do justice 
(or even to fully disentangle) in such a short space. Consequently, what follows is quite tentative and 
speculative. But some reply seemed better than none, and perhaps this is only a first stab at some of 
the issues. 
 
The Problem and Problems with It 
 
The essay begins to set up the problem: we are told that ―The rich libertarian professes allegiance to 
Robert Nozick‘s version of libertarianism‖ (77). He might, but it ought to be understood that there are 
many other options. Nozick‘s principles are cited, which don‘t need to be rehearsed or criticised here. 
It is then concluded that, given the history of manifestly illegitimate acquisitions, ―the rich libertarian 
is highly confident that the current distribution of property is tainted and morally suspect‖ (78). And, 
admittedly, to varying degrees this may well be so. However, it is immediately relevant to raise 
several issues. 
1) It is worth noting that most people tend to consume most of what they earn in their own 
lifetimes. So how significant are any inherited resources with respect to ―the current distribution of 
property‖? It seems plausible that inherited resources are for most people somewhat less than a few 
per cent, and often vanishingly small. 2) Whatever the actual percentage of inherited resources, the 
illegitimate percentage (state transfers and privileges aside, for the time being) is likely to be another 
quite small percentage of that. So what about rich libertarians? Hardly any of them will be rich 
through illegitimate inheritance (more on this below). 3) The illegitimate percentage does not 
somehow infect the legitimate remainder like the proverbial rotten apple in a barrel. Even if as much 
as 25% of what you possess were to be historically illegitimate property, then why should you lose 
more than that 25%? 4) There is also the matter of the burden of proof. Any existing property ought 
first to be shown beyond reasonable doubt to be illegitimate, the degree to which this is so, and who 
the wronged parties are. To opt instead, for instance, for an indefinitely continuing general 
redistribution on the basis of mere plausible but untestable speculation is bound to undermine justice, 
liberty, and welfare far more than it promotes them. 5) Suppose I invest illegitimate inherited gains 
and turn those gains into far greater gains. The value of the original inheritance might be owed as 
compensation, but not everything else even though I would have nothing at all without the original 
illegitimate inheritance. To take an extreme example, if I am fed nothing but stolen food until I am 
fully grown, then the value of the food (plus interest and any damages) just might be owed by me in 
compensation to any victims (at least, if the thief cannot be caught and somehow be made to repay).
4
 
But my body itself or anything I have earned by using it would not be owed as compensation. Mutatis 
mutandis, the same would seem to apply if I unknowingly used an illegitimate inherited sum of 
money to start a business that subsequently grew to be successful. 
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 It is ―might‖ because it is not clear that even this is correct: an innocent beneficiary of originally stolen 
resources is not always clearly liable to return them or their value – a shopkeeper who unwittingly receives 
stolen money in payment, for instance (although stolen goods are usually treated differently). 
The essay continues that ―It‘s quite possible that he has a greater share of resources than he would 
have had there not been a long history of violations of the historical entitlement theory of justice‖ 
(78). Strictly speaking, were history to have been even slightly different than it actually was before we 
were born, then we would not exist (because of the famous ―butterfly effect‖ of chaos theory). Our 
parents – if even they existed – would not have met, or not have conceived us (as a particular egg 
fertilized by a particular sperm). Therefore, everyone has a greater share of resources simply by being 
brought into existence by causal connections that include past injustices. The general point and this 
immediate reply are both known in the relevant literature. It seems best to assume that we can put that 
counterfactual issue aside and deal with where the resources are now compared to where they ought to 
be from the viewpoint of any genetic descendants or other likely types of inheritors. There are various 
problems and issues that arise concerning past wrongs and their potential rectification. And while this 
response will touch on a few of them, it will mainly focus on the problem posed as having ―a greater 
share of resources‖ due to ―a long history of violations of the historical entitlement theory of justice‖. 
And concerning this, there appear to be two key questions. First, how large is that ―greater share of 
resources‖ likely to be? And, second, what is the best way to rectify this? Answers will be attempted 
by briefly considering three important cases: 1) the possession of great earned wealth; 2) American 
slavery; and 3) land usurpation. 
1) Most of the wealth that an extremely wealthy businessman possesses (political privileges and 
patronage aside, for the moment) is not usually due to any historical injustice that has benefitted him 
in particular, but, rather, due to his entrepreneurial skills, hard work, and good luck. And if a tiny 
percentage were due to historical injustice, then that would usually be the same for most people in that 
society. So any rectifying between him and fellow citizens, at least, would not seem to be significant. 
2) Consider the case of American slavery, which Macleod 2012 mentions (78). It is, perhaps, first 
worth realising that, given the global history of slavery, it is likely that virtually everyone is 
descended from a slave and a slave-owner too (and possibly cannibals as well, for that matter). Yet 
now we are all largely dispersed around the world and all suffering from a loss of potential capital 
accumulation. For slavery is not only a great evil, it is also a great inefficiency as it cannot be as 
productive as a free market in labour – whereby people tend to receive returns in proportion to their 
productivity and both parties gain in all transactions. Are matters very different if we focus on the 
historically recent slavery in the Americas? Is it relevant that many or most of the people who are 
descended from American slaves will also have been descended from (still historically recent) slave-
owners and slaves, because slavery was endemic to Africa? To some extent might this make any 
claims to compensation today complicated and compromised? For instance, what if the likely 
alternative to slavery in America was slavery, or slave-ownership, in Africa or elsewhere? 
It might be assumed that Africa would have been much better off now if slaves had not once been 
removed in such huge numbers. That seems unlikely. The continuing problems in Africa relate far 
more to current politics there than to previous slavery (and, in any case, the alternative to post-conflict 
slavery was death). So a related point is that most black Americans are significantly better off as a 
result of their ancestors having been brought to the USA as slaves. Most of Africa is no paradise 
today, and even slavery persists there in various forms. And that is one reason that very few black 
Americans want to go to live there. However, perhaps this contingent good fortune (assuming it is 
such) of one‘s ancestors being taken to America should not be allowed in the balance, just because it 
is unrelated to any damages owed. For instance, if you steal my car and crash it due to brake failure, 
then you still owe me for the car you stole despite having saved me from a potentially fatal accident. 
There seems some force in this point as regards damages. However, those damages were owed to the 
victims by the perpetrators, and it is not clear how that situation could be ‗inherited‘ by the 
descendants of both groups (and, in any event, most whites and many blacks too are descendants of 
people who immigrated since slavery was abolished). More relevant to the case in hand, Macleod 
2012 is not about calculating such damages (although they do seem important with respect to 
libertarianism and justice) but only the undeserved gains of rich libertarians. And, in that case, there 
remains the question as to whether any white Americans have received a significant and continuing 
inherited advantage from black chattel slavery. 
Many of the poorest whites in the U.S. are as poor as the poorest blacks. Is the ordinary white 
American, at least, any richer as a result of past black slavery? More recent capital accumulation, new 
technology, greater division of labour, and – again – their own skills, hard work, and luck would seem 
to be overwhelmingly what made them as well off as they are (any government corruption aside).
5
 Of 
course, if there were some way of calculating and demonstrating any remaining ill-gotten inherited 
white gains and black losses (with identifiable property and identifiable people, at least), then 
compensation would be due (although Macleod 2012 itself is – partly due to its socialist outlook? – 
only concerned about illegitimate gains in excess of equality). But it is not obvious that such gains 
will be significant or that they must exist at all. On the contrary, it is entirely possible that, unlike the 
blacks themselves, virtually all whites are no better off today as a result of black slavery (and quite 
possibly worse off due to the additional crime and general conflict, all at least exacerbated by political 
interventions). 
3) If land was stolen from one genetic group by another genetic group, so to speak, then this is a 
more plausible example of where compensation for continuing gains might be due. The descendants 
of the land-usurpers are benefitting greatly today from the original usurpation. But any compensation 
is best dealt with in the law courts by some reasonable calculation of the loss, not by some endless 
general redistribution process (which must itself become unjust at some point, and probably 
immediately). Moreover, in this land-usurpation example, there are several factors that might often 
significantly reduce an apparently huge initial compensation claim. i) Aboriginals cannot reasonably 
claim to own, for instance, a whole continent – or even hundreds of square miles – just because they 
are itinerant. They did not create the land and they were not using it all. The amount should be more 
like that required for individual homesteads. ii) After all the free-market development, the criterion of 
proximate loss should probably not be the current market-price of the land or the land itself (despite 
what existing statist laws might say). Rather, it should be what it was worth to the aboriginal owners 
at the time on the assumption that they would have sold it for something like that amount. And this is 
likely to be relatively modest.
6
 iii) What about the potentially huge compound interest on the debt? 
This is sometimes cited as being a far larger problem. Clearly, no new immigrant who just bought the 
land could be responsible for that debt. What about an inheriting genetic descendant? It is hard to see 
how even he could be personally liable for such a debt. If that debt is regarded as attached to the land, 
then he might have to cede the land. But why should a current landowner owe that compound-interest 
debt any more than a similar unpaid debt from historical unpaid damages not related to land? Why 
should land be special? Only the particular people or organizations that were responsible can be liable 
for the interest on their unpaid damages. Such debts cannot be forced onto later innocent parties. They 
should be regarded as void, just as with any so-called ‗national debt‘. iv) Without going into the, often 
controversial, details of each case, archaeological evidence indicates that many so-called aboriginals 
might themselves have been earlier usurpers. If so, their claims to compensation are thereby possibly 
weakened to some degree. Why return stolen land, or its full value, if it was only stolen from earlier 
thieves? v) To what extent, if at all, are the descendants of the various alleged aboriginals really worse 
off now as a result of the usurpation? They typically seem to enjoy many of the products of the free 
market. And most of those products would not be there if the descendants of the original usurpers 
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 If they would not have sold this natural resource, then a forced sale for a reasonable sum could also be 
libertarian (first-user property claims can sometimes proactively impose on later people). 
were not also there. This might seem to be muddling rights (or entitlements) and benefits. But what 
benefits we have received can affect what we are rightfully due: it can sometimes affect a claim for 
damages (at least the full amount due) that one is no worse off, in fact considerably better off, as a 
result of some admittedly illegitimate imposition. However, although this sometimes or to some 
extent ought to matter with respect to libertarianism and justice, Macleod 2012 is, ex hypothesi, only 
concerned with any illegitimate wealth among rich libertarians. 
So how plausible is the thesis that a rich man ―certainly cannot establish that the property he 
currently controls is justly his‖ (78)? It is undoubtedly predominantly justly his, if acquired via recent 
exchanges that did not violate liberty; rather than working for the state, for instance, or enjoying state 
privileges. In fact, any recent state transfers and privileges will be far and away the main sources of 
illegitimacy – not injustices generations ago. 
 
The Main Answer to the Main Argument 
 
Now we reach the main argument: ―the rich libertarian can identify, with reasonable determinacy, an 
excess. He thinks Nozick provides a reasonable way of identifying this‖: 
 
lacking much historical information, and assuming (1) that victims of injustice generally do 
worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in society 
have the highest probability of being the (descendants) of victims of the most serious injustice 
who are owed compensation by those who benefitted from the injustices (assumed to be those 
better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a 
rough rule of rectifying the injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to 
maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society (Nozick 1974, 
231). (78) 
 
As already explained, we could dispute this argument on the basis that the alleged discrepancy due to 
past injustice is nugatory. Moreover, time and again we see propertyless, non-English-speaking, 
immigrants arrive and achieve above-average wealth within a generation or so – despite suffering 
from government taxation, regulation, schooling, welfare, and even conscription. So it seems unlikely 
that the past is what is significantly holding back the groups of least-well-off natives (i.e., those born 
there). And it is also relevant that, in the given quotation, Nozick appeared to be at a theoretical loss 
from a libertarian viewpoint and so simply reached for Rawls‘s maximin rule to patch up the problem. 
However, we do not need to press any of these points. For the correct response here is the same as it is 
to Rawls himself: if you want to ―maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in 
the society‖, then that is what libertarian private-property anarchy will do. The compound growth in 
prosperity that the free market brings will give the least-well-off group more than they could have 
under any other known system. 
This argument might fail to convince socialists (unless they think about it seriously, at least). But 
that is not really the point. The point is that Macleod 2012 offers a philosophical argument where the 
key assumption is really an empirical presupposition that free markets keep the poor impoverished. 
And yet, ceteris paribus, the world appears to have less poverty wherever, and to the extent that, it has 
freer markets. Consider the essay‘s conclusion, that ―The perhaps surprising implication of a 
libertarian principle of rectification of this sort is that material inequalities in our world are 
presumptively unjust‖ (78). The correct libertarian reply is that not only is there no such implication, 
but, on the contrary, it is only to the extent that ―material inequalities‖ on a libertarian basis in our 
world are tolerated that the conditions of the ―least well-off group‖ are maximally improved.  
Even if this response‘s historical and pro-market interpretations are substantially mistaken, it is 
still an absurd overestimate to suggest that ―a reasonable approximation of the rich libertarian‘s 
excess, is the amount of resources he has above what he would have if resources were equally 
distributed‖. That assumes, without any clear explanation, that possessing anything more than 
complete equality is an illegitimate ―excess‖. This leaves no room at all for just acquisition above 
equality, and no room at all for a functioning economy. 
What is the amount of ―influence historical injustice has had on current property holdings‖ (79)? 
Regarding ancient history, almost none (the butterfly effect aside). So how can we ―find a way in 
which [the] ugly legacy of historical injustice can be neutralized‖? Regarding recent history, we might 
usefully start by making state-employed or state-regulated academics take honest jobs and pay back 
the extorted money on which they live, and by depoliticizing the organizations with state privileges 
and extorted funding that pass themselves off as universities. It is certainly not true that the best way 
that ―The rich libertarian ... can materially improve the lot of the worst-off‖ in the long term is to give 
them his ―excess‖, i.e., anything above equality. This is because – even as an unenforced social norm 
– equality completely undermines capital accumulation and thereby rising wages and growing 
prosperity. 
In footnote 6, Macleod 2012 admits that ―we might discover that the maintenance of some 
inequalities works to the benefit of the worst-off‖ (78). However, it then says, ―But we can suppose 
that the principle of rectification presumptively favours distributive equality‖. Nothing that Macleod 
2012 has said appears to make this supposition plausible. There are unjust unequal holdings (and 
unjust equal ones too, if we are really interested in justice), and these ought to be rectified as far as 
this is practical. But the vastly overwhelming majority of unjust unequal holdings (and unjust 
holdings generally) relate not to ancient illegitimacies but to modern and daily state-institutionalized 
transfers and privileges. Moreover, these illegitimate transfers and privileges predominantly punish 





There is no ―rich libertarian problem‖. But there is a confused-socialist problem. Consequently, the 
―personal behavior‖ that socialists mainly need to engage in is the study of libertarian contributions to 
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